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ABSTRACT
What an architect does, designing, is a design act and not the making of
an object, a design. A design act is an intentional act about built use.
We give reasons for intentional acts and are responsible for knowing that
the reasons we give for design acts are as relevant and correct as we can
know them in terms of their built use. The reasons we give for design acts
distinguish them from other acts, such as drawing, which is the making of
objects. One of the reasons we may give for our design acts is that they
are following a rule. For a design act to be following a rule, there must be
a fit between the rule and what we do in practice. For a design act to be
about construction, a form act, there must be a fit between the form act
and what gets done in the field.
Thesis Supervisor: N. John Habraken
Title: Professor of Architecture
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"Design is not an architectural event. It is human
events set free by the use of architecture."
(quote from the application of the author to graduate
school, 16 January 1983.)
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Preface: The Position
As I think back on the material that's been written for this essay over
the past year, it occurs to me that the most direct description of this
writing about architectural design is that it is a moral essay. At first the
idea that, as a philosopher, I have been concerned with a moral topic is a
troubling one. Ethics, as a topic in philosophy, has always run the risk of
becoming a kind of preaching about how other people than oneself should
see the course of human events. My work and position as a philosopher, I
thought, was a neutral one, directed at clarifying events as they fell into
commonly understood human life forms, but not going so far as to say
how these events should be regarded.
Yet throughout the past year the question kept arising, if this is an
analysis of what it is to do design, what kind of analysis and whose view
of what such an analysis is, is it? Am I saying that this is the only way
to clearly understand what doing design is? Am I saying that if one does
not understand doing design as I analyze it, one is not doing design, or,
in the final analysis, one is not doing good design?
In the course of working, I have deliberately not wanted to confront
these questions. I have wanted to do the analysis, to prove it is a possible,
consistent, and even useful analysis, and leave it at that. The choice of
whether it is the only analysis of architectural design, or good design, was
left to the reader, the person who is perhaps concerned with those choices
because it is their profession, though they need not just be architect, but
could be historian, critic, politician or otherwise involved. I thought it
most productive and also a natural limit to simply offer a neutral tool,
which could be applied as it suits the understanding of the reader.
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But from the moment that I describe doing design as an intentional
act, I realize that I have entered into the area of moral philosophy in which
people are now responsible for their actions. If one has got an intention in
doing design, then what we mean by this is that one is able to say what
the intention is and what the reason for the intention is. The reason falls
into that zone where it is a form of justification, based on expectations
about the consequences that doing a certain design will have on human
events. This always hard to define relationship between the design moves
and their consequences becomes a problematic proof, for which we give
arguments from history, arguments from logic, and arguments from what
we accept as physical fact.
To be true to this effort, I must accept some of the responsibility
inherent in its attempt to give a clarification about doing design. The
position I take is that design acts are intentional acts about built use, for
which the designer has the responsibility of being answerable to his best
knowledge of the consequences of those acts, based on his own experience,
his knowledge of the historical consequences of those acts, and the logical
extension of this knowledge to what he can imagine anew. As in all moral
arguments, this leaves room for debate, and it leaves room for more than
one consistent and reasonable resolution to the design question at hand.
A moral position is not a conclusive position. We are responsible for what
we know, and we are responsible to know the most we can, but none of us
can know or foresee everything.
vii
Introduction
This thesis makes two points. One is that design is an act. The second is
that design is not an object.
This investigation comes from a perception about how we talk about
doing architecture as it relates to what we do as architects. Underlying
the vocabulary we experience in our education as architects and how we
talk about our practice, and how critics talk about our practice seems to
be a fundamental confusion about what design is. We refer to drawings
as designs and critics refer to buildings as designs and yet we also talk
about designing for use, designing for people. Largely unnoticed, there
has become a division between these two kinds of talk, and it is the point
of this thesis that this division has come about because of a conceptual
misunderstanding of what architects do when they do design.
The thesis argues that what architects do is design acts. The argu-
ment for this is extensively given in the second part, and a discussion of
what kind of act a design act is occurs in the third part. The beginning
section presents how this basic confusion is manifest by what we do in
practice. It is the sole offering of this thesis that looking at doing de-
sign as a design act may begin to give us a clear and productive way of
understanding and talking about what we do as architects.
It is the nature of discussions like these to appear to be saying the
obvious. If the reader prefers to think that treating (architectural) design*
as the making of an object is just bad design, instead of not designing at all,
that is a position which is the reader's option. However, the thesis offers a
way of looking at designing in which making an object is never designing,
*"Design", in this thesis is short for "architectural design", and "we" refers to
us as architects, or is the editorial "we", according to context.
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and only sometimes a by-product of designing. It is the claim of the thesis
that looking at design in this way may help us avoid some mistakes in
practice, but it is not a guarantee against making other mistakes. If offers
a way to see our work and talk about it more clearly. If all this comes
to appear obvious, then perhaps I have said something which is right in a
way in which it needed to be said.
ix
1Part One
Design Acts in Architecture
In this section we will introduce the topic of the thesis in three ways. We
will try to give a sense to what we mean by design acts by looking at what
professionals do in practice. We will introduce the vocabulary used in this
thesis in relation to this discussion, and we will give a general argument
for the concept of design as an act. This argument will be explained in
detail in Part Two.
Design Acts in Practice
Conceptual distinctions, unlike semantic distinctions, are reflections in our
language of what we actually do. Our use of 'design' is not a semantic
question, whether we're using the correct term, but is here a question
about what we do in practice. The examples which follow are not imag-
inary cases; they are taken from actual practice. Whether they point to
good design as opposed to bad design is not so important as the concep-
tual distinction they try to show about designing as an act compared to
the confusion of producing "design" as an object.
Our first case is one in which the clients' stated needs were to make
their existing house structurally sound before making changes to the house.
Some structural repairs had already been done to the house and the clients
wanted to know what else was needed. They called an engineering firm,
which sent two engineers to inspect the house. The engineers told them
2that the house was built incorrectly, and they drew up a set of framing
plans for the entire house.
Concerned with whether the engineers' plans took their future needs
into account, and confused about the framing plans, the clients asked
two architects to review the situation. After going through the house
with the clients, the architects sat down with them and reviewed the
engineers' plans in relation to the house structure and future client needs.
They showed the client that some of the structural plans by the engineers
would be almost impossible to carry out and that others were expensive
and would not substantially improve the structure. In the instance where
the engineers' drawings showed a new carrying beam, for example, two
new carrying beams already existed and there was no need to do it over
differently.
The architects then proposed that they sketch specific solutions for
particular problem areas in the house, but that other things which needed
to be done just be documented as a written report of their conversations.
They later reviewed the sketches and verbal agreements with the client
and the carpenter who was to do the work, clarifying both what was to
be done and how it was to be done by talking and pointing things out
on the site. They proposed that some specific things which needed to be
done, such as drainage around the kitchen sill, not be done until the client
decided if they wanted design changes to be considered for the kitchen.
We would say that what the engineers did can be regarded as produc-
ing an object, a set of framing plans which ignored the existing conditions
and needs of the client. The plans were drawings only, of marginal, if any,
use to the client. They were just a legally stamped document of correct
framing plans for a house the same size as the clients' house.
3What the engineers did indicates that, from the start, they conceived
their work as producing a specific kind of product. They did not consider
the sorts of things it is part of a design act to consider, whether such a
product was appropriate or necessary.
What the architects did were design acts, a number of related activ-
ities to show how the clients could get what they wanted. These activ-
ities began with reviewing the house with the client and coming to an
agreement about what the appropriate services were. They then used a
combination of discussions with the client and the carpenter, sketches,
pointing out and discussion things on the site, and records of these con-
versations to do what they agreed was most expedient to meet the clients'
needs. In the course of their work they never produced one document
which they claimed to be their renovative design, but instead considered
all their activities together to be a means of understanding how to fulfill
their clients' needs, structural soundness in the building related to future
changes. These design acts, all together, are what they thought of as
designing.
What we mean by this distinction between seeing design as an object
or as an act, in practice, can be shown in what is more obviously an
architectural design situation-the fitting of a bank into an existing retail
space. In this case, the engineers' attitude which we have just discussed
is manifest by the architect.
The bank program required a separate closed space for accounting and
a safe, a counter to serve customers and a related work space for processing
paper work. The architect drew up an attractive, visually stylized space
with angled counters, a glassed-in work booth with the safe, and a large
window open to the street.
4After being built, working in the branch office was found to be dif-
ficult. Bank rules require that the door to the safe room must remain
closed. The only place where the safe could be fit made it necessary to
open the booth door into the counter area in order to get the safe door
open. Every time the booth door opens, it forces the service counter per-
son to work down at the small angled end of the counter. With two people
working at the bank, the most commonly heard exchange is "excuse me".
In this case, we would say that the architect saw design as an object,
such as a drawing labeled "bank", showing a bank layout. If this layout
had also worked for the complex activity of banking, we would not say that
the architect conceived designing as the making of an object, but would be
able to talk about design acts which expressed how banking activities, and
a banking environment, would be related to built changes. The architect
could have talked to people who knew banking regulations and provided
a convenient way to access the safe. This conversation would have been a
design act and also the reason for drawing the safe location in a particular
way, another design act. Acts of discovery relevant to the situation are
design acts, and omitting them is omitting that part of designing.
One design act may be a reason for another design act. If the architect
had talked to or observed people working at a bank service counter, he
probably would have discovered that an angled counter in a limited space
would make it difficult to work, wasting space needed behind the counter
and giving space to the customers, where it was not needed. Designing
according to such observations or conversations would be a design act,
but drawing the counter at an angle for the sake of just having a visually
interesting counter would not, by itself, in these circumstances be a design
act. It is the job of the architect to spatially and visually enhance the built
environment related to our activities in it. To do something for the single
5purpose of visual excitement (partly a question of taste in itself) is treating
designing like an object, the record of which is just drawing another object
on paper.
This regard of designing as the making of an object rather than as a
design act is perhaps epitomized by a case that a carpet manufacturer's
representative told me. An architect had designed a large complex in
China, including a temple. For the temple floor, he designed an elaborate
hand woven rug covering the whole space. When he returned to see the
finished work he found that the people in the temple had shaved large
grooves in the rug to separate the spaces in which different people were
allowed to sit. Apparently, the architect had designed a beautiful object
without relating it to the context and activities of the place and people
who would use it. Finally, the people themselves had done a vernacular
design act and shaved the rug to make it right for the context of the
temple.
Vocabulary in Architecture
In this thesis, we will think of the object oriented work with which de-
signing may be confused as the documentation of a "project", often the
set of plans describing how an object is to be laid out or built. We will
use the word "proposal" for what the architects did for the house client,
various means of setting forth possible built changes which relate to the
clients' requests in a given' situation. A "proposal" is a design act when
it is done in one of the ways, or similar ways to how the architects went
about meeting the needs of the house clients. All proposals, in designing,
are design acts.
6Not all design acts are proposals, for they may sometimes be a means
of arriving at proposals, such as the diagramming that architects do to
see the relation between spaces, or the amount of built space compared
to unbuilt space. A proposal is not the drawing or the model or a set of
plans, but is what is suggested by these things when they are the results
of design acts. As a general term, a proposal is the relation of changes in
the built environment as the result of coordinated design acts considering
the uses of these changes.
In this thesis, when we talk about designing, we will not use the term
"project", because it more easily connotes some kind of object to be made
than the term "proposal", which suggests putting reasoned hypotheses up
for consideration. (In the growing literature, the term "project" has al-
ready been give a bad name, and people are writing about "non-projects".
But "non-project", to us, is just like talking about "non-bad", missing why
we do not want to talk about designing projects.)
Throughout the thesis we will begin to make use of certain expressions
in our talk about designing. We will use "projected work" or "design pro-
jection" to suggest that designing is proposals about future work. Design
proposals are also predictions about the uses of future work, how it will
meet client needs and how it may offer possibilities of use in an environ-
ment. The work we call a "built environment" rather than a "building"
because we examine built uses and not isolated objects. We will not talk
about designing a building because we are suggesting understanding de-
signing as acts concerning the uses of possible future environments ("built
uses"), not acts, like drawing, which represent a building as an object.
This may happen in the course of designing, but as will be examined
later, is not itself designing.
7We call our whole mode of work "design acts" because what we are
doing is projecting built uses and we can give reasons for thinking that
these projections will work for an intended use. Design acts may include
various dialogues pertinent to the work in question: talk with the client,
talk with the people making the built work, talk with the people who use
similar work, for the purpose of examining how people have used such
work in the past and projecting these uses in similar or changing ways.
Sketching, modeling, and writing, as part of an explanation of what is to
be done, or how to understand what is to be done in a built environment,
are design acts. Only in a particular context and accomplishing a commu-
nication about particular design questions in that context, are they design
acts. As professionals making a sketch, for example, we may already see
the sketch as a design in itself, forgetting for that moment all the con-
ventions in the sketch which show how our design may be realized. These
conventions become part of our explanation when we must read the sketch
for someone who is inexperienced in the conventions. Then we describe
the design acts in the sketch verbally. The sketch is just a different kind
of communication of a design act than a verbal or a written conversation.
There is not, however, such a thing as a "design act" and its communica-
tion; a design act is communicated by various means- talking, modeling,
writing, or gesturing, which we refer to as a "mix of design acts" which
an architect may use.
Intentions in Design Acts
The examples which we looked at in "Design Acts in Practice" show that
conceiving doing design as making an object is much more common in
8practice than one may want to think. The "projects" which get done
because of it can be more or less subtle in their destructive impact on
our use of the built environment. It raises the question of whether our
standards of acceptable practice are so low, or whether this conceptual
difficulty in how we perceive designing is not so obvious as it seems when
we clarify design as an act. Sometimes it is just this apparent triviality
of a distinction which is missed. "Design is an intentional act about the
use of a projected built environment" is a position against projects like
the bank branch, the engineers' plans, or the architect's temple carpet. It
is not just that design is an act, which is where we start to perceive how
difficulties have arisen. After all, sketching in itself is an act, and so is
making an object. Just saying that design is an act does not distinguish it
from either of these acts. It is essential to say that designing is never the
making of an object, as is, for example, sketching, and it is also essential to
say that design acts are about the uses of a projected built environment.
To look at it in another way, we can say that intentions in a design
act are about what will happen to an environment and the people in that
new environment if it is realized. There is a sliding scale going from:
object to built use to use.
The realm of design acts in architecture touches the edge of the object
and the edge of use, and centers on built use, how the projected built
environment may be used. If we confuse design for the making of an
object (like the bank branch), we run the risk of making an uninhabitable
space. On the other hand, to make the role of people the whole design is
no longer designing, but group participation, without an organizing guide
considering the uses of a particular environment.
9The most subtly deceptive language in architecture is talk about uses,
what people do in their environment, and talk about buildings as objects
which are assumed to relate to these uses. Just naming the two in the same
sentence will not do the job of a design act about the use of a projected
built environment. I remember a well known architect showing a slide of
an extra wide staircase landing and describing it as a place for people to
sit or rest in their enjoyment of the view. There was nothing about the
landing that would invite anyone to sit or even build a place for sitting.
It was the major passage place in the house, there was no room to sit by
the window (in the direct glare of the sun) and to sit opposite the window
by the railing would have blocked the passage.
It is critical in our exposition of design acts that we will talk about
them as intentional acts for which one must be able to give reasons, and
that these reasons are to some extent, the extent of our knowledge, ar-
guable and verifiable. Thus I must introduce, into our notion of "built
use", that "how the projected built environment may be used" must in-
clude reasons for showing that how it may be used is arguably true. We
must be able to show, for example, that the way in which a staircase
landing is to be built is what invites sitting there, that there is a familiar
and recognizable connection between how something is built and how it
may be used. In "built use" we do not mean objects and their uses, we
mean that the use occurs in part in the way something is made. "Built
use" is not a synthesis of "object" and "use", but is a built expression of
what we do in everyday life. If we cannot give reasons which show these
possible uses in the work, then we are just giving lip service to the credo
that we are making buildings for people, or that we are doing use-oriented
architecture.
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The Concept of 'Design'
In this last section of Part One, we will give a general argument for 'design'
as an act. The selective history of the theory of meaning in philosophy,
which begins Part Two is an explanation of the dilemma of seeing design
as an act or as an object, and it is also a reinforcement of how we can
understand 'design as an act'.
Our use of the word "design" is an exemplary case of the conceptual
tricks that the grammar of ordinary language plays on us. It is natural to
say that a drawing, or set of plans, or model, is the object of one's design.
There is no denying the physical object in this case, and there is even a
strong temptation to postulate a mental object: "I've got the design in
my head". The physical object we will return to, but let us examine the
mental object first.
We say things like, "I have the design in my head", and "I have an
image of a room with rough walls and small openings for light". The
problem is that we cannot understand these as designs without some fur-
ther explanation. One cannot just say, "Look into my mind" and get the
response, "Ah yes, I see it!". To have the design understood, one must go
the further step of drawing it, modeling it, or even discussing it in detail.
We can call designing a "mental activity", if we like, as long as what one
means is that one can go the further step of conveying the design by one
of these methods. We do not deny that we have images of our designs.
But what we mean by having an image is that we could represent it or
discuss it so someone else could recognize it.
Now we come to look into this representation, the physical object of
design. If I say that the picture is my design, it is part of our ordinary
11
use of 'designing' that I can give an account of how I developed the re-
lationships shown in the picture. If I couldn't give any account of the
process by which I came to draw a building you might say, "That's in-
teresting, did you copy it?" Perhaps I say, "It came to me all at once
and I put it down completely finished. I had a complete image and I just
drew it out." Here we might say that I never designed the building, it
is not how we learned to use 'designing', I just drew it. But if I could
add, "Look, this is carefully thought out" and then explained all sorts of
relationships in a way that described careful control and reasons for the
workings of the built environment, then we might say that I designed it
because of the explanation I gave. The point is that how we learn to use
'designing' was not by simply presenting a full-blown object of design, but
was by going through a process, which may have numerous descriptions,
by which the proposal came about. We might describe the needs of the
client and how they are reflected in the building, also giving reasons to
support that these design moves will in fact accomplish what the client
needs. Our descriptions are of a proposal for satisfying some person's or
persons' requirements in an architectural way which is also understanding
of a history of people's relations to similarly organized built environments.
If there is a physical object representing the building, it is not neces-
sary for designing, since it is possible to design a building, as pointed out
above, through extensive conversations in specific circumstances. These
conversations may be with the client, with the people who make the build-
ing, and with other people who are considering how to make these built
changes. This is possible because conventions about the organization of a
building and the making of a building already exist, and can be conveyed
by conversation as well as by a drawing or a model.
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Thus the object which is called a design, which at first appears central
in our language, can be regarded as an insufficient and not necessary
condition for doing design. With this understanding, we naturally begin
to talk about "doing design" and "designing" because now we are talking
about a particular process of organizing the needs of the people who are
variously engaged in the proposal. We shift from talking about the object
to which a design refers, to a design proposal, which is a hypothesis about
peoples' use of a built environment.
13
Part Two
Words, Objects and Design Games
The method of the general argument we have just given for design as an
act and the conceptual viewpoint of the argument both have their roots
in how some of twentieth century philosophy has come to understand the
question of the theory of meaning. The selective history of the theory of
meaning which follows serves as a further explanation of the argument for
design as an act and not an object.
The theory of meaning is concerned with language and the meaning
of words within language. 'Design' is considered a concept word, having a
complex use within the professional practice, encompassing organizational
and practical skills, taking many varied instances of its use. As we men-
tioned at the beginning, conceptual distinctions, as we now understand
them in twentieth century philosophy, are not semantic distinctions which
can be explored through the grammar of a language, but are reflections
in our language of what we actually do, including what we say as part of
what we do. This advance in the theory of meaning is an important point
in understanding how such statements as "These plans are my design" is
not referring to design as an object, namely the plans.
Besides the benefit of understanding the philosophic changes in the
theory of meaning for the argument about design as an act, there is one
further reason why I have chosen to be so explicit about the philosophic
14
sources for the position of this thesis. Architects and critics of architec-
turet have referred to philosophic positions as arguments for their particu-
lar views about architecture, especially in writings about Post Modernism
or offerings of views opposed to Post Modernism. But almost without
exception the reasons for the philosophic positions are not given. In phi-
losophy one can find arguments supporting any point of view, and quoting
from them should not help to prove a point. In giving the evolution of the
theory of meaning, we can now examine the issues behind the position we
take.
A Selective History of the Theory of Meaning
We begin with an account of how the problem of the theory of meaning
may be generated, and proceed with how this problem was looked at by the
medieval logicians, Frege, Wittgenstein and some of his contemporaries.
The Problem
Being middle sized planet Earth mobile entities, human beings have the
habit of bumping into and observing most often other relatively middle-
sized objects and creatures, of natural or of humanly arranged origin.
Communication, as a customary response of human beings to their en-
vironment, has thus naturally focused on the middle sized objects of our
surroundings. Yet, when we stop to understand or distinguish the sub-
tleties of our environment and human activities, we find that the first nat-
ural impulses of our language easiiy lead us into confusion. Our language
tSee bibliography.
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has grown up with us, around common objects and beings, the "chair",
"desk", "table", "ball", "papa", "grocer" and Aunt "Mabel". But as our
commands and demands become more sophisticated and exploratory, the
simple match between word and object no longer serves our purpose. We
can no longer point and say, "There's an electron jumping its shell" or
"This band of wavelength is 'red'".
Our language, at this juncture, points not to objects, but instead
presents complex concepts, the meaning of which is given in their use by
variously sized groups of human customers. Yet the beginning picture of
words designating objects, which so impressed us in our youth, has stuck
not only through our adulthood, but through centuries of philosophers
trying to define the relation between word and object, as the 'meaning' of
the word. The history of philosophy shows meaning to have been taken
as a 'relation', a 'property', an 'attribute', a 'perception', a 'sensation' or
'sense-datum', etc., all with their various treatises on how we are then to
go about defining this 'relation', or distinguish these 'sense-data'. In archi-
tecture, for example, we can find discussions of the 'meaning' of a building
as its 'form', or as its 'perception' (as a phenomenological construct).
In philosophy, even with the invention of these new objects of mean-
ing -relations, properties, etc., no one has found a way to simply put the
meaning of a word as an object and make it commonly intelligible. Ad-
mittedly, as we learn a language during our first few years, the simplest
form of the meaning of a word as its object, or the object it names, seems
to work alright. We say "bowl" and we get it, and both young and older
avoid the cries of frustration. As long as we limit ourselves to this early
type of exchange, our equally early and primitive concept of meaning does
16
not work out too badly. But it works, not because it is an extendable def-
inition of meaning, but so far as our cries, gestures, and human behaviors
are concerned, it does the job without offense, and that is all we ask of it.
In fact, the notion of meaning here is so inoffensive that a major
deception has already slipped into our account. It went unnoticed that
our description of how we learn and begin to use "bowl" does not need an
account of 'meaning'. All it requires is a description of what we do and
the circumstances in which we do it. Later on, a child may ask, "What
does 'tureen' mean?", and we may point to one, saying "That's a 'tureen'"
(ostensive definition), or if no tureen is at hand, say, "It's a large bowl
used to serve soup from" (verbal definition).
From the form of the question and our ever-present orientation to mid-
dle sized objects, we may get the impression that we have given the 'mean-
ing' of "tureen" by showing or describing the object. Although we haven't
given any 'meaning', we've just shown the use of the word "tureen", so
oriented are we to connecting a word to a middle sized object, that we
take the object to be the meaning of the word. The immediacy of human
orientation to middle sized objects, and to the way we begin to learn a
language, then misleads us one step further: people first thinking about
the problem of what words in a language mean rapidly get to the point
that they realize not all words in language are words for objects. Follow-
ing their early experience of learning language, they then try to invent an
object to which each word in a language refers, and call this object the
meaning of a word. Meaning thus gets conceived as an object in itself,
and that is how the notions of meaning as a 'property', composite 'per-
ception' and 'sense-datum' may be generated. But for centuries, when
we have asked questions about 'meanings' which we ask of ordinary ob-
jects, philosophers have been faced with an astounding shrinkage as our
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language gives back less and less that makes sense in terms of the usual
questions we can ask about a common object. Is meaning big, black or
blue, and in how many pieces can it be taken apart?
Looking for a way to relate every word to an object, nineteenth and
twentieth century philosophers thought they would get out of this dilemma
via the developments in mathematics. Mathematics seemed such a precise
language for scientists that it was thought that by translating ordinary
language into mathematical representations, we could get all the precision
needed for meaning by matching words to mathematical objects. Thus
the meaning of a word would be its mathematical representation. This
could not be done with simple arithmetic, but going back to Aristotle's
syllogisms, (like All brutes are pigs, Blackbottom is a brute, therefore,
Blackbottom is a pig) we developed a language called "logic" which could
be used to represent such syllogisms and order their manipulation.
Medieval logic distinguished between singular and universal propo-
sitions, such as "Piglet says 'oink'" and "All pigs say 'oink'", but left
unresolved to what (we may now call) the class of all pigs referred. Not
knowing to what 'all pigs' referred made it problematic to determine the
truth or falsity of the proposition "All pigs say 'oink"'. This made the
very nature of Aristotle's syllogistic arguments problematic, and led to
such exhausting assertions as "if every pig we find says 'oink'", then "all
pigs say 'oink"' is true. Of course, on some days, Piglet does not say
"oink", he says "unk", and we are back in the basket of philosophical ob-
jections: How often and consistently must P say "oink"? Is this little pig,
who looks extremely like Piglet, but has never said "oink" still a pig?
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Frege's Contribution
The pivotal person, whose work snapped the theory of meaning, via Aris-
totle and Kant, into the twentieth century was Friedrich Ludwig Got-
tieb Frege (1848 - 1925). In the process of revising and presenting a new
symbolism for mathematical expressions, he evolved a philosophy of logic
which became the hinge between the old, mentalistic picture of meaning,
seeing a word or symbol as representing an object (of varying sorts) and
the twentieth century picture of logical expressions in which their meaning
is seen in their use, not in the object(s) named by these expressions.
Frege (forgive us) put the pig back in the pen by understanding
"Piglet" as a proper name and 'pigs' as a 'concept-word'. Secondly,
the proposition in question is not: say "'oink'". It is : "all say
'oink'". Hence, the logical subject of this proposition is a concept, which
operates like a function in mathematics, taking different arguments, such
as "Piglet". The search for the meaning of "all pigs" in every little pig
poked to elicit "oink" is put to rest. Frege was the first to suggest that
a concept can be used like a function in mathematics, and eliminate the
need to find a meaning for 'all X's' as the subject of a proposition.
Some of Frege's famous contemporaries still retained the view that
every expression stands for some kind of object. Russell held this position
in The Principles of Mathematics. He developed a doctrine of 'sense-
data' to make up these objects, but they had nothing to do with Frege's
use of a 'concept-word'. Frege held that the logical sense of a proposi-
tion is determined by giving its necessary and sufficient truth-conditions
(those propositions, which when shown to be true or false, show the truth
or falsity of the proposition in question.) This truth-conditional way of
viewing the sense of a proposition is found in varying forms in Medieval
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logic, Frege's work, and the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein ( Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus), keeping in mind that the conception of the object
of a proposition changed as we've discussed.
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Wittgenstein's view
Wittgenstein's view went through a transition, and it is the result of this
transition that is the basis for the conceptual viewpoint of this thesis,
namely that doing design may primarily be understood as an intentional
act. Frege showed us the jump away from the object as meaning. Con-
temporary with Frege's view, Wittgenstein (1889-1951) gave a picture of
logic in the Tractatus which was a demonstration of the limits of language.
Wittgenstein later came to see the Tractatus not as a picture of the limits
of language, as he may have at first thought, but as a picture of the limits
of viewing language as logic.
In the Tractatus he says such things as:
5.4711 To give the essence of a proposition means to give the
essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world.
and
5.526 We can describe the world completely by means of fully
generalized propositions, i.e., without first correlating any
name with a particular object.
I think, and this is probably a controversial point, that Wittgenstein never
broke with the logical picture of language he developed in the Tracta-
tus. Rather, he broke with the view that this picture described the world
completely. There are descriptions which cannot be put as propositions,
because their occurrence is part of human life and circumstance, which
can be given various descriptions, none of them complete at any one time.
This later view of Wittgenstein, as it has come to be called, is most fully
expressed in his Philosophical Investigations.
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In his work after the Tractatus, Wittgenstein demonstrates a way of
analyzing concepts that uses ordinary language, independent of positing
either neurological or psychological objects for the understanding of these
concepts. The way in which he wrote, or thought, or talked, was the
methodology to be learned: an approach to conceptual clarity which left
the rough stone as the rough stone, showed it for what it could be, but no
longer had to demonstrate an argument in logic to get the picture clear.
In moving through the body of work that leads into and through
the Investigations, Wittgenstein took some of the results of the Tractatus
along. Naming, in the Investigations, is part of a preparatory process for
learning an elementary form of a language: following an order, giving a
command, counting. In the Tractatus, names were the parts of elementary
propositions:
4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a
nexus, a concatenation, of names.
4.23 It is only in the nexus of an elementary proposition that
a name occurs in a proposition.
4.24 Names are the simple symbols: I indicate them by single
letters ( 'y', 'z').
In his continuous account, naming is a preliminary for using a lan-
guage, be it the language of logic or a spoken language. The difference
with the Tractatus comes in his next move, when he says,
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into promi-
nence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an
activity, or a form of life. (23. Investigations)
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The limits of logic, as shown in the Tractatus, is that speaking logic is not
part of an activity, or form of life, in the same way speaking a language is.
In speaking a language, human gesture, expression and tone of voice are
part of the import of the activity of speaking a language. One's expres-
sion, tone of voice, and actions are irrelevant to the outcome of a logical
argument.
Wittgenstein's introduction of 'language-game' was not just a more
expansive way of looking at language than representing language by logic.
His emphasis on speaking a language as part of a human activity was
intended as a way of understanding what people mean by examining what
they say. This includes how people learn to talk, giving examples of what
people say in certain circumstances, and examining what we would say
about the examples. An excerpt from Peter Geach's notes during the last
year of Wittgenstein's professorship in Cambridge University may serve
to show how a language game is not something specific, but is a way of
showing how people mean an expression:
Witt: Is pain a sensation? There are similarities and differences-but
what is true of the various sensations. What is closest to seeing?
A blind man learns by touch most of what we learn by sight. But
there is a fundamental difference.
Geach: One doesn't point to the eye when asked where one sees a thing
in the way one points to the finger when asked where one feels a
thing.
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Witt: But more fundamental-you learn shapes by handling objects.
There is nothing analogous for vision. The analogy of sight and
touch isn't what one would expect. Suppose a man feels a thing
is a square, sees it is a square. What are the analogies and
differences? People would say we feel it is square by tactile and
kinaesthetic sensations. But what is the difference?
Geach: You couldn't teach "square" by a square rubber stamp pressed
on the skin.
Witt: Or if you could it wouldn't matter; because it would be different
from the way I have been discussing, of feeling a thing is square.
It would be an extra, third way of recognizing square objects.
Would one be tempted so much to talk of a square tactile sense-
datum? "Sense-data" always chiefly mean visual and auditory
data. "Tactile? We'll see after them later" is the attitude of the
sense-data philosopher.
One might be inclined to say hearing is closest to sight. Why?
"Articulateness" is what comes into my head to describe the
similarity.
What is tactile sensation? In learning the shape of an object
with eyes closed, sensations of hardness, etc. play very little
part. People would say it is sensation of motion and position
that play the most important part.
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With regard to sight and hearing it is natural to speak of appear-
ance and so of sense-data. It's much less natural to talk about
the sense of touch. Why?
A child doesn't learn to talk about sense-data. People say "sense-
data are given-the physical object is a logical construction".
Now suppose we taught a man words for sense-data, e.g., "A" is
going to mean a sense-datum of the table. The danger now is to
think I can give a name privately- look at a table and say "I shall
call this look A". For this doesn't tell me how even I can call any
later appearance by the name A. But I could draw a picture and
say: "What looks like this is A".
Suppose we had two children. One child learns "table" first and
the other learns first words like "A". Now if a child learnt both
it could no doubt say "the table is A"; but if it learnt only words
like "A" it could never reach the concept of "table".
Thus Wittgenstein brings out the difference between our recognizing
a tactile sensation and our being in pain by looking at what people would
say in particular situations and by looking at how people learn related
expressions. Behind Wittgenstein's remark that learning a language is
learning a technique is the sense that, by examining what we say and
how we learn a concept, we can get information about the use of that
concept. In general, we can begin to understand a concept by looking at its
accepted use, the language activities which are examples of its commonly
understood practice. If someone does not grasp the sense of a concept,
but insists on using it in a way that is at odds with its usual use, we
can take their odd use of it and show incompatible consequences. This is
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what Wittgenstein is doing in the previous dialogue when he shows that
one cannot learn "table" by getting taught "A", the sensation for table.
Wittgenstein spent much of his time looking at concepts which our
language misleads us into thinking stand for objects, showing them to be
unnecessary counterparts to the use of the concept in question. In the
dialogue above, he shows that "sensation" is not a separate entity which
is the 'object' of the word "pain". He does this by bringing out that one
way we ordinarily use "sensation" is our tactile sense, holding or touching
an object, and this use does not apply to 'pain'.
This point about our use of "pain" not representing an object to
which "pain" refers can be made more general than its comparison to
sensation. We can point out numerous cases in which we say of ourselves,
"I'm in pain", or we say of someone else, "He's in pain", when no such
object is in question, yet we use the expression and understand each other.
We understand when to say it of ourselves because of the circumstances
under which we learned the expression (someone saw us fall, and asked if
we were hurt or in pain). We understand when to say it of someone else
through the different circumstances under which we learned to say it of
another person. Perhaps we see them grimace, or have an accident and
make a particular gesture. In examining our use of "pain", we find there
is no definite object to which it is attached, only our use of the expression
in certain circumstances. This leads us out of thinking we must come up
with some object of pain in our "mind", or some special physiological stuff
in our bodies, in order to understand our use of the expression. No such
object was in question when we learned "pain" or when we use it.
Examinations like this (which can become far more detailed and com-
prehensive) are used to show that there are familiar "games", activities
of which speaking is a part, that we play with certain concepts, such as
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'pain'. When we mix 'pain' games up with language games that describe
a visible object, for example, we are misled by the structure of our lan-
guage into looking for a superfluous and indefinable object. Analysis of
a concept investigates the language games in which that concept is used,
and shows also how its use does or does not cross-over to other language
games using other concepts. Thus we reach what clarity we have about our
concepts by coming to understand more specifically what use and abuse
their expression has in our language, the use they have in our activity of
expressing ourselves to each other.
The sort of discussion that Wittgenstein had about 'pain' is the same
kind of discussion we have been having about 'design'. In the first section,
we looked at examples of doing 'design', and at the end of that section
we examined how we talk about 'design' to show that, like with 'pain',
there was no specific object to which "design" refers. In the examples
from practice, we tried to show that when "design" was treated as the
making of an object, people were not doing design, they were making
things which represented objects for which people had little use. In the
general argument trying to show that our concept of design is the concept
of a family of acts in particular circumstances, we examined how we learn
'design' and how we use 'design' in our conversation. In the following
section, we will examine this method of analysis, using what people say
to understand what they do, in more detail.
'Designing' and Language Games
Thus far in Part Two, we have described the evolution of a general theory
of meaning which can be used to explain why we see 'design' as an act.
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In the process of designing we may produce objects which we also call our
design, although this sense of "design" already has been shown inessential.
But someone could take the history we have developed and say, "Alright,
we have shown two distinct senses of 'design', the one which concerns acts
and the one which refers to objects." Since we do not want to say that
now we're using 'design' as an object, and now we're using 'design' as an
act, we need to carry this history further and show how we can account
for both uses with the single concept of a 'language game'.
We will begin by giving a more specific explanation of Wittgenstein's
notion of a 'language game'. We can then discuss how 'designing' may
be analyzed as a 'language game', showing how 'designing' covers certain
acts and also the things we sometimes produce in the course of these acts.
This picture will become more complete in Part Three, which follows, on
acts and design acts.
'Language Games'
When we begin to learn a language as children, we are taught a primitive
form of association between a word and an object. Someone points to an
object and says, "Book!", gestures perhaps, repeats the word in a certain
tone, and continues until our response resembles "book". There has been
no explanation of what a book is, so we could say we have been in a kind
of training. We have been trained, when we get it right, in what we call
the "naming" of an object.
This training process is preliminary to using a language. It is a process
which resembles language. Perhaps the teacher wants to pile a number
of things on a shelf, and for this purpose has taught his helpers just five
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words: "book", "pen", "paper", "jar" and "vase". When he calls these
words out, his pupils bring these objects in the order he calls them. We
could say that he has taught his pupils a primitive language. This is also
a kind of training in which the communication functions clearly without
any explanation. The words of this primitive language may have been
taught ostensively, by pointing to the object, making certain gestures and
using a firm tone of voice.
Wittgenstein would call this whole process of using this five word
language a "language game", one of the ways in which children learn their
native language. The process of naming these objects and repeating the
names after someone is also a language game, like the children's game of
"Giant Steps" ("You may now take two giant steps" or "two baby steps"
until a line drawn on the ground is reached).
Thus far this is a primitive language in which the words refer to
objects. But now the teacher says, "Put the book there" and points to
the shelf. Here there is no explanation of the word "there" other than the
use of the word when he points to the shelf. The use of the word occurs in
the action of pointing as it is said. This second language game has gone
beyond the primitive language game in that the words no longer just refer
to objects and the teaching of "there" includes pointing in the use of the
word. Although it may all look alike on paper, the teaching of a language
rapidly gets to the point of many diverse language games in which the
uses of words are fundamentally different.
A language game consists of "language and the actions into which it
is woven" (7. Investigations). At the level of a primitive language these
actions are not part of the use of a word, but are a simplified training
showing the use of a word in naming an object. This gives us a philosophic
tool for understanding a concept. We take the concept in question and
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imagine its use in a primitive language. Sometimes what this shows us is
that the concept has no such primitive use, such as the concept of 'pain'
in the dialogue given earlier. The dialogue shows that "pain" is not a
word for an object as we learn such referents in our training in a primitive
language. The grammar of our language misleads us into thinking "pain"
stands for an object.
As Wittgenstein uses the term "philosophical grammar", it is totally
unlike the sense of linguistic grammar in which "pain" is a noun and
nouns in general refer to objects. A philosophical grammar is a conceptual
grammar and its work is to clear up the differences in the use of a word
or concept which are obscured by the ordinary grammar of a language.
Problems in understanding concepts arise because our everyday lan-
guage is not a primitive language. Actions are a part of our language and
enter into the use of language in many diverse ways. Distinguishing the
various ways actions occur in our language gives us a better understand-
ing of our language. Thus, when we clarify a concept, we examine not
language per se, but the language games in which the concept is used.
Designing and Language Games
There is a primitive language game that occurs in our use of 'design'. In
the profession, there is a primitive use of signs which stand for various
objects in the built environment. On paper, we call some of these graphic
standards, consisting of conventional signs for windows, bricks, concrete
block, gravel, ground, electric outlets, etc. We can learn the names for
these signs by looking them up in a table or by having someone name them
in a drawing. A similar conventional naming takes place in model making,
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where certain physical elements consistently represent steel, asphalt, brick,
screening, etc. We can also learn some of these preliminary terms in
conversation, when someone points to a brick and says, "that's a 'paver'".
In our design training it is true that we learn primitive language. But
the use of this primitive language, while it is preliminary to doing design,
does not occur as a primitive language in the actual practice of doing
design. Locating a column in a building is a complex act of considering a
variety of implications: where the column comes out in a room, and how
that column can influence the possibilities of what may happen in the
room; how the column relates to the foundation, what it supports, what
will be exposed of the column and what kinds of connections are involved
with other materials; how all this will affect the look of the building,
placement of windows, and the rest of the support system. Locating the
column, as a design act, is not a primitive sign for an object, but is an
action, the reasons for which consider any number of details related to the
whole. The drawing of the sign for a column on paper is deceptively simple,
until we understand the design game as a whole, and see the drawing of
the column not as a mark for an object, an expression in a primitive
language, but as one of many considered and related acts, coordinating
the implications of where and what the column is.
Using Wittgenstein's concept of 'fanguage game', we get a way to
understand how in fact we may make objects when we are designing, but
making these objects is not designing, it is part of the primitive language
game we learn when we start to learn the language designers use. If we
look at the drawing of a floor plan for a building, for example, we may
read it, at the primitive level, as a number of signs for objects. But if
we read the plan as a design, we are no longer reading it as symbols for
objects. We understand it as a complex design game, one possible picture
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of a myriad of design acts which are part of the understanding of the
drawing in front of us. The symbols for objects on the drawing are not a
design. The drawing is only part of a more complex design game which
involves many acts, such as drawing a column to come out in a particular
place in the entry of a building, in its expression.
Thus we have a concept of 'designing' which allows for the represen-
tation of objects, but does not call this representation "designing". We do
not end up with two senses of 'design', one standing for an object such as
a set of plans, and one standing for design acts, the means by which we
arrive at those plans. There is one sense of 'design', which is a complex
activity organizing built human life forms.
This activity can be in conversation, talking with a contractor, with
a craftsperson, with a client, with another architect. It can be arrang-
ing three-dimensional materials, making various types of drawings, sitting
back and contemplating various possibilities, and analyzing existing built
works in reference to the concerns at hand. Designing may be any com-
bination of these different activities or design games, and as technology
advances we invent new ones: working on a computer in a given environ-
ment.
When we analyze what architects say when they are engaged in these
activities, we analyze design language games, and can get clearer about
our concept of 'design'. What we do is design acts, and the whole situation
in which these acts take place in relation to one group of concerns, we can
call a design game. An act in a design game we will then sometimes talk
about as a move in a design game. The notion of a 'language game' frees us
from talking about 'design' as an object, because we can now understand
how such objects are preliminary to designing, but not part of designing,
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which is a different kind of act than making an object. We must now
examine more closely what we mean by design act.
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Part Three
Acts, Design Acts, Form Acts and Rules
Acts
What all design games have in common, on our view, is that moves in
these games are acts. The relevant question, then, is "What makes these
acts design acts?". To answer this, we must first discuss the more general
question, "What kinds of acts are design acts?".
In action theory, there is a broad distinction between voluntary and
involuntary acts. Involuntary acts are the beating of your heart, the jerk-
ing of your knee when the doctor hits it with a hammer in the right place,
or the raising of your arms after you have pressed them hard for a while
against a wall. These are cases in which you don't say, "The doctor made
my leg jerk". If, however, I see you kick the doctor when the hammer has
not touched you, I say, "You kicked the doctor", and you might say, "Yes,
I wanted him to think my reflex was alright (with a vengeance)". We call
this a voluntary act.
We may describe a voluntary act as either intentional or uninten-
tional. For example, you might say, "I didn't think I would kick him, he
turned around just then", and we would say that you kicked him unin-
tentionally. If it were your intention to kick the doctor, you would give a
reason for thinking that raising your foot would reach him, e.g., "He hit
me so hard I wanted to get him back."
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There is a distinction between motives and intentions. You might
have said that you kicked the doctor for revenge, and this would be the
motive for (but not the intention behind) your action. It is not this kind
of motivated acts we are interested in, regarding design acts. We are not
concerned with an architect who specifies blue ceilings because "A or C
has a love of blue ceilings". We might be interested if the reason A gave
for a blue ceiling was that only a particular shade of blue would give the
sense of height to the room that would enhance its purpose.
The sense of intentional acts which concerns us as design acts are
those for which we can ask the question, "Why (did you do it)?" and get
predictions justified by a reason for acting. These are reasons for thinking
that the statement of the prediction has the relevant application, or, is
true.
Design Acts
Since in design we are dealing with intentional acts, we must distinguish
between all the descriptions we can give of a design act, and A's reasons
for doing it. The relevant description is the one which is given in reply
to the question, "Why?". For example, there is a plan drawn with three
foot six inch high counters. We could give the following replies to why the
counters are 3'-6" high:
i) to be out of reach of young children
ii) to make it difficult for people in wheelchairs
iii) to be in proportion to a high space
iv) to make it easy for the carpenter who has a 3'-6" rule.
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The reason A gives for doing Y (drawing 3'-6" counters) is that A's
clients are six feet tall, and A wants to keep them from bending too much.
This is different from saying that 'A intends to do Y' implies 'A intends
to do i) - iv)'. What A intends, in the relevant sense of a design act, is the
reason A gives in reply to the question "Why?" such that it is a reason
for thinking that the statement, 'Six foot tall people will not have to bend
over a 3'-6" counter too much', is true, or will have the desired results.
A may never have thought of i) - iv), or even if A had, none of these may
have been A's reasons.
Consider the opposed case, in which A cannot give a reason for a
design act. We are looking at a plan, for example, showing some steps
leading from a deck to the ground. We point and ask, "Why are the steps
there?" and A cannot give us an answer. We might say, "Did you just
draw them there?" and if we got a positive reply, we would no longer
be talking about a design act, we would just be talking about making a
drawing.
We might push to find the design act by asking such questions as
"Does the circulation lead through here?" or "Does this bring one out to
a certain view of the landscape?". If we never get an affirmative answer
from A, we say that A has not designed the steps, A's just drawn them,
arbitrarily as far as we know. If A were to say, "Yes, that's it, this leads
you to a place between two rocks and connects you to a path beyond
them", then we begin to see the reasons for the design act of drawing
the steps from that part of the deck. We can question the veracity of
A's reasons ("But the rocks are actually here on the site"), which is to
question the truth of A's reasons on a factual level. We may also question
the design judgment of A's intention, "Wouldn't a less direct entrance to
the path be a more interesting walk?".
36
It is thus possible that our conversation with A, our going to the
site with A and walking through the place for the steps and observing its
connection to the site, can all become part of the reasons for A's design
act in specifying the steps. These reasons will show up in A's reply to
the original question, "Why are the steps there?". Possibly, A may now
reply, "The steps lead to these rocks on the site, which will become steps
to a rock garden which appears beyond the trees". Then we know that
A's intention in putting the steps on that part of the deck is to connect
the deck to a rock garden, using the stones as part of the connection.
In this example, we are trying to bring out how the intentional acts
of designing differ from the intentional acts of drawing. We notice that
what we say and do when we are professionally designing is relevant to
whether we say A is designing or not. (In doing an analysis of what
gets said or cannot get said, we examine the language games of designing
and drawing to distinguish and understand these concepts.) We see that
reasons for designing are distinct from reasons from drawing. Reasons can
be given which apply just to drawing, "I drew them there to balance out
the composition on paper" and reasons like connecting the steps to the
entry to the rock garden apply just to designing.
We cannot give a list of reasons and say, this is a list of design reasons,
or this is a list of drawing reasons. There may even be cases in which the
reasons for the one overlap with the reasons for the other, depending on
the circumstances. But we can investigate these reasons as we have above,
and begin to see differences between design acts and drawing acts, even
when a design act may involve drawing.
Thus we can see in another way how design acts are not the making of
an object (a drawing or a model) but are the projection of how built works
will affect our lives. We have not created an intented object, a drawing,
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but have made hypotheses about a built environment, for which we can
give specific reasons showing our intentions. It is possible that we can be
designing and drawing at the same time, but that does not make them the
same. We can hit a ball with a bat and study the velocity of the ball at
the same time, but our descriptions of what we are doing and our reasons
for what we do will differ. How what we say and do differs is the reason
why we have the two different concepts in the first place.
Because architecture is such a competitive field now, it has become
the emphasis of some architecture schools to make slick, graphically strong
presentation drawings. These drawings have come to have less to do with
design than with seeing, to the point that the drawings of well known
architects sell separately from the work to be built. This has led to the
judgment of an architect by his/her peers, critics and the public according
to the drawings to the the point that the design is obscured and secondary.
Even buildings have come to be read as graphic assemblages, so that work
by well known architects has been talked about in terms of its visual
package, when its internal space is quite ordinary, or even disfunctional.
The conceptual distinction between designing and drawing is impor-
tant to see not only at the conceptual level, where we distinguish the act
from the object, but also at the level of practice. It is here that works like
the branch bank we discussed earlier get built, and it is here that work
like the engineers' plans get made as solutions to built human needs, when
they are only graphic presentations.
We persist in looking at 'designing' in contrast to 'drawing' because
this is a primary place where the confusion about 'design' as an object
arises, and it is a source of confusing drawing for designing in practice.
We cannot give one simple argument for all cases of distinguishing drawing
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from designing. We can continue to point out, however, general ways in
which the two differ.
Making a mistake in designing is different from making a mistake
in drawing. Earlier we suggested an example where the designer may
have thought he or she was projecting a set of steps in relation to a site,
but it could be shown that the stones on the site were different from the
designer's assumption. In a drawing, this accuracy in correspondence to
reality is not a criteria. One may put the rocks wherever one pleases in a
drawing.
There are also different practical criteria for saying that a design is
alright than for saying a drawing is alright. We can look at a design on
paper and say, "These steps are not right because they cannot be built the
way you have drawn them." We might then discuss in sketches various
ways the steps could be built, and choosing one, modify the drawing. If
what we had done was just drawing, it would be possible to reply, "Yes,
they cannot be built that way, but that is how I see them (or want others
to see them)". How the steps can be built need not enter into the drawing,
but must, at some point, enter into doing design.
Thus the use of 'design' turns out to be significantly different from
the use of 'drawing'. We give different reasons for drawing than for de-
signing, we have different criteria for saying a drawing is alright than for a
design, and mistakes in designing are different than mistakes in drawing.
Integration in designing has different standards and a different liability
than integration in drawing. In drawing there is an object to discuss. In
designing, the objects we make use of are not the design, for we can design
without them. Designing is a process of making projections about built
work. These projections are intentional acts for which we give particular
reasons. The object we may be tricked into searching for, "the design",
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vanishes when we analyze the complicated game of designing, and distin-
guish it from those language games in which words refer to objects.
Form Acts
In Part One on Design Acts in Practice, we argued that design acts were
about built uses for which we could give reasons. In Part Three we have
been discussing what kind of acts design acts are, and how they are distinct
from other acts, such as drawing. We continue to add to our understand-
ing of 'design acts' by distinguishing, among design acts, those design
acts we call form acts in which we emphasize the built part of built use,
the connection between design and construction. We will then end our
exposition on design acts by looking at rules as reasons for design acts.
Following a rule is itself an act and is therefore also a way of emphasizing
how designing may be an act of following a rule.
A form act is a design act which directs built use in terms of its
construction. Each form act must have an intelligible translation into
a material and spatial construction and also have possibilities of social
interpretation as its use.
Lines in a drawing showing a brick wall or a wall in a model showing
brick material or written instructions for a wall to be made of brick have
connections throughout a particular design to such things as the size of
the footing, the height of the space, types of window openings, acoustic
effects, hardness, warmth, durability, locations of building systems, cost,
maintenance, flexibility for future use, relations with the inside and out-
side, physical connection and perceptual movement at adjoining surfaces.
When a brick wall is part of the vocabulary of a form act, it has these
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and other possible interpretations and implications, the whole field and
context of the design projection making them more specific.
When we have said that a form act is an intentional act of directing
our built environment, we could still be talking about the placement of a
fire hydrant in relation to the sidewalk, for example, and we have not said
whether such a form act is architecture. Our method of deciding whether
a form act is part of an architecture depends on a common acceptance of
the description of a design game, within which such a move is seen as a
component in an architectual proposal.
An architect, designing a city block, might indicate in plan where the
hydrants should be located and give a description of why the hydrants
should be there. Alternatively, there could have been no indication of
where to put the hydrants and the architect might describe the plan in-
dicating that the location of hydrants is irrelevant to the proposal. In
the first case, we can say that their location was intentional and part of
the architecture; in the second case we say the opposite. We can argue
about the second case that their location should have been part of the
proposal. We do this by giving a description of the proposal which makes
their location part of the design game. This is just architectural criticism,
until the architect accepts the new description in the context of the design
game. Then we can say that not giving the location of the hydrants was
a designing mistake. We have made the rules of the design game explicit,
but we must be playing the same game to say whether or not a move is
part of the game, and therefore arguable within the context of the game.
Form acts are intentional acts, the reasons for which can be given
by an architect's description of the design game. We cannot say whether
only one description of the design game is correct. We must agree on
a description to decide whether a move is right or not, and within the
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same game description we may further have to agree on priorities. These
agreements, in architecture, are highly complex, and may change from
game instance to game instance. They may change in the same game
over a period of time, so five years from now, we move the hydrants.
Descriptions of design games, in architecture, are not fixed. We give a
description of the game to moderate our choices and to make it possible
for us to coordinate our decisions.
Our description of a design game is not actually what happens. It is
a way of freezing a slice of designing time so we can experiment with it.
Wittgenstein says of language:
When we study language we envisage it as a game with fixed
rules. We compare it with, and measure it against a game of
that kind. (Investigations, p. 77)
We are trying to give a conceptual picture of architecture which shares in
this way of looking at language. If I gave twenty characteristics of a cat,
a creature might walk through the doorway which only had a few of those
characteristics and had many others, but which we could still call a cat.
In architecture, an intentional form act is like the cat in that we cannot
give a limited definite description of it. Whether we call something a form
act or not will depend on our agreements about the design game. These
agreements are like what Wittgenstein here refers to as the "stationary
picture":
If we look at the actual use of a word, what we see is some-
thing constantly fluctuating. In our investigations we set over
against this fluctuation something more fixed, just as one paints
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a stationary picture of the constantly altering landscape. (In-
vestigations, p. 77, my italics)
For the purpose of investigating a design situation, we freeze the landscape
of our proposal, making agreements which will guide our design moves.
Under a description of these agreements, form acts are intentional design
acts which show the construction of a built use. Thus an architect, who
is responsible for his/her intentional design acts, is responsible for the
accuracy of a form act as it fits the built use and as it instructs someone
in the field. We will examine how a form act fits what someone does in
the field further, in the following section on rules.
Rules
Design acts are intentional acts about built use for which we can give
reasons. One of these reasons may be that we are following a rule in our
design acts. In this section we will look at what it means to do a design
act according to a rule.
Suppose there are two cases of the use of structural layouts, one using
a certain size bay on a grid system and the other using a free-formed struc-
ture which does not follow a pattern. Both layouts have spatial freedom
in relation to the structure and both may have structural economy. How-
ever, each system will probably have different spatial possibilities, which
we would expect to show up in the architects' descriptions of their form
acts. Differences in their descriptions of structural space would show that
they were implicitly following different design rules, and we would expect
their buildings to show this.
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Suppose, however, that two buildings with totally different structural
layouts looked identical, or had the same materials and sizes of enclosure
for walls, ceilings, floors and openings. We would then be inclined to
say that the design rules these architects were following were the same
(perhaps a code book for the same number of spaces of specific size and
materials). We would not expect them to give structural-spatial reasons
for their form acts, but instead to refer to the code book as the rules for
their proposals. If they did mention the structural systems, we might say,
"Yes, but you went by the code book for what you did, for here's another
building with a different structure, which uses the same code and looks
alike".
There must be a fit between the rules some one gives and what some-
one does. In the different structural cases where we get the same building,
we would say that the fit between the structure and the buildings was co-
incidental. What the buildings both fit is the code book. If the buildings
were different and the architects could describe these differences in terms
of their structures (as one way of describing their differences) then we
could say the structural choices were part of the rules by which they were
designing.
These cases are of course a simplified example. We do not want to
imply that architects using the same rules (if they ever do) get identical
buildings. Nor is it the case that architects using different rules cannot
get identical buildings. The reason we say that using the same rules would
not lead to identical buildings is that the rules are not complete descrip-
tions of the buildings. When the rules become complete descriptions, and
we get fifty replicas of Howard Johnson's, we no longer say that we are
designing (we're replicating, if you like). On the other hand, it is a logi-
cal possibility that architects using different rules could generate identical
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buildings. This is such an unlikely possibility that we would doubt what
they say about the rules they were following.
Thus far, we have said that a reason for a form act may be a rule, the
limits of rules are such that they do not completely describe a built/unbuilt
environment, and something can be a rule only if there is a fit between
the rule as a description of what someone does and what they actually do.
What we mean by this fit between a rule and a form act may be brought
out further by a more abstract example (we invent a primitive language
game to further show what 'following a rule' is).
Imagine a design game like a board game, in which the board is
divided into squares, with an empty bank of squares in the middle and
various pieces with specific starting positions (analogous to the existing
conditions, or accepted terms of a proposal). There are two players, who,
instead of competing, have the common goal of moving their pieces so
that the center bank contains only the largest pieces, and smaller pieces
branch out from them. There is the limitation, like in chess, that the
pieces can only be moved in a certain pattern in relation to the board.
The two players are called a D-team, and they must be careful in moving
their pieces not to cancel out pieces that they may need for their common
solution. This cancellation happens in that they must take turns moving,
and they must not get their pieces in such a position that the only next
move will cancel out another piece. They can, however, cancel out each
other's pieces deliberately.
Suppose that they have each made six or so moves, when D-1 takes
D-2's "pillar" piece. D-1 looks surprised, stops for a while and studies the
pieces, then moves a "panel" piece forward. Now D-2, we could say, either
looks pleased and quickly moves another "panel" piece into position, or
promptly takes the "panel" piece from the board and replaces it with a
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"beam" piece. Observing the play, we could say that in the first instance,
when D-1 plays the "panel" piece, D-1 grasped D-2's intention and could
continue the series of moves. In the second instance, when the displeased
D-2 replaces the "panel" with a "beam", we would say that D-1 misun-
derstood D-2's intention. We would say D-1 misunderstood until, perhaps
D-1 added another "beam", D-2 played a "girder", D-1 added another
"beam", D-2 added another "beam", and so on, without any hesitation or
puzzled looks or impatient gestures.
We stop the game now and ask D-1 and D-2 to give us the rule
for placing "beams" and "girders". Perhaps D-2 produces a sketch and
says, "For this many beams, you need this many girders, as this gives a
framework which will fit onto the board like this". But D-1 says, "Well,
I know when you don't play the 'pillars', you have to use the 'beams'
and then the 'girders', so I just continued the game by playing a 'beam'."
Would we want to say that D-1 and D-2 both knew how to continue the
same series of plays, but only D-2 could describe the rule? Or would we
want to say that they both knew the rule, but D-1's description of the
rule was different?
Assume that we have had these conversations with D-1 and D-2 sep-
arately, in private, and as they continue to play the game the moves come
out to look like D-2's sketch. Then we could say that they both knew the
rule, only D-1 gave a different description, or could have been following
the same rule as D-2, but was following it implicitly. But if they continued
to play and the moves came out quite dissimilar to D-2's sketch, we could
say that they had changed the rule, used another rule, or didn't under-
stand or follow a rule at all. We would finally have to look at what they
did and the circumstances in which they did it to decide whether they
were following a rule. Their descriptions could be different and we could
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say they were following the same rule, according to the circumstances in
which they continued to play and the moves they made. A rule, for these
purposes, need not have the same description by every player, but must
give a similar reading of the results in similar circumstances.
Our friends D-1 and D-2 go about designing, as it were, by working
out a series of moves which are consistent with the given and evolving
circumstances of the game. The descriptions of these series could vary,
but the descriptions would have to fit the circumstances in such a way
that they show us how the players arrived at the outcome. In the earlier
case of the identical looking buildings, it was the code book that provided
these descriptions. If we ask, "How do we know when a rule for a design
act is a rule for that particular design act?", our answer is that it is the
rule for that design act when it shows us how the designer moved from A
to B. A rule, like a design, is not an object with a singular description,
but is known through the act of following the rule. The act of following
the rule is expressed as a rule, and expressions of the rule may vary. Thus
design acts may be rule-following acts, which show another way in which
designing is an act.
Summary
The practice of architecture, designing, is the practice of design acts. De-
sign acts are intentional acts concerning projected built uses for which we
are accountable to give reasons supporting these projections. Responsi-
bility for our intentional design acts is thus a kind of moral responsibility
for not only having reasons for our proposals but also for the nature of
these proposals to concern built use. When our proposals are disguised
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as pictures of proposed objects, we are not doing design, but are making
representations of objects which may be more or less arbitrarily devoid of
any built use resulting from their making. Designing is not the creation
of an object, but is the creation of a built use. We cannot and should
not be able to predict all of these uses, as the environment is open to
interpretation and change. We are accountable for the specific built uses
for which we are employed and the ones for which we are not specifically
asked, but which our knowledge of built/unbuilt human events specially
equips us to consider in the course of doing our work.
If we accept doing design as this kind of intentional act we cannot
avoid this responsibility and our training and everyday work must be ex-
amined anew in light of design acts. From here on out, all of the interesting
work begins. It is a harder and continual and more exciting challenge to
recognize the reach of architecture more directly in our lives, even as we
do it. Just as we are what we eat, we are what we draw, it is our own
acts, as architects, our design acts, which make us what we are. Built en-
vironments are artifacts of our human history, the responsibility for which
we can now understand in 'design acts'.
48
Bibliography
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd Ed., New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1958.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Grammar, Berkeley, Calif.: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1974.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, New York: The
Humanities Press, 1961.
Further reading in Wittgenstein's work, and on 'intention':
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, The Blue and Brown Books, New York: Harper
and Row, 1958.
Anscombe, G.E.M., Intention, 2nd Ed., Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1966.
For reading of Frege's work, see:
Geach, P., and Black, M., Translations from the Philosophical Writings of
Gottleb Frege, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966.
For a different view of language, consistent with Wittgenstein's, but more
accessible, see:
Quine, W.V., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1969. See especially the essay, "Speaking of
Objects".
49
Examples of work by architects or architectural critics using philosophic
references are:
Eisenman, Peter, "The Futility of Objects", Lotus International, New
York: Rizzoli International Pub. Inc., 1984/2.
Rudd, J. William, "Architecture and Ideas: A Phenomenology of Inter-
pretation", Washington, D.C.: Association of Collegiate Schools of
Architecture, Inc., Vol.38/2, 1985.
Schon, Donald, "Learning a Language, Learning to Design", Architecture
Education Study, vol.1, Andrew Mellon Foundation, 1981.
Norberg-Schulz, Christian, Intentions in Architecture, Cambridge, Mass.:
The M.I.T. Press, 1965.
50
Biographical Note
Ellen Saslaw graduated Colby College with honors in philosophy
and then taught as an Instructor in philosophy there before at-
tending graduate school in philosophy at M.I.T for two years. She
has worked as a designer-contractor for eight years with her own
firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where she currently practices
as a designer.
